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FROM THE HISTORY OF ABULMAMBET KHAN'S FOREIGN POLICY



Abstract

The diplomatic service plays an important role in the complex process of state building. The formation of diplomatic service was especially manifested in the times of the Kazakh khanate. The development of international relations and diplomacy of the Kazakh khanate was not inferior in its level to strong states that had their place in the world system, and was an important indicator of statehood and independence. It fell under the jurisdiction of the khans who ruled in the Kazakh khanate and was considered a privilege recognized by both the people of the country and neighboring states.

This article sets the task of studying the activities of a personality who left his mark in the historical development of the nation to realize an important humanistic task. If we say that the evaluation of a historical personality from the national point of view generates respect for the history of the nation and a sense of patriotism, then one of the personalities that can be turned into the object of such a study is Abulmambet Khan. Within the framework of the article the authors analyze Kazakh-Russian, Kazakh-Jungar relations as factors that reveal the political and social activity of Abulmambet Khan – a historical personality who ruled the country in the XVIII century. Also considered are the khan's goals in foreign policy, his influence on the socio-political situation of the Middle zhuz, relations with the Younger zhuz, as well as diplomatic activities of specially trained officials of the khanate and representatives of the Kazakh aristocratic group.

The scientific novelty of the article lies in the fact that this is the first study in the Kazakh language, which separately considers the foreign policy of Abulmambet Khan. In the course of the study, the authors identify the peculiarities and versatility of Abulmambet Khan's foreign policy using specific examples.

Keywords: Abilmambet, Khan, politics, diplomacy, Turkestan, Dzungarian, strategy.

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ӘБІЛМӘМБЕТ ХАННЫҢ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСАТЫНЫҢ ТАРИХЫНАН

Аңдатпа

Мемлекеттік құрылыстың күрделі үрдісінде дипломатиялық қызмет маңызды роль алады. Әсіресе дипломатиялық қызметтің қалыптасуы қазақ хандығы тұсында айқын көрініс алды. Әлемдік жүйеде өзіндік орын алған мықты мемлекеттермен қатар Қазақ хандығының халықаралық қатынастары мен сыртқы дипломатиясы мемлекеттіліктің және оның тәуелсіздігінің маңызды көрсеткіші болып табылды. Ол қазақ хандығында билік құрған хандардың құзыреттілігіне енді және елдің адамдары да, көрші мемлекеттер де сөзсіз мойындайтын артықшылық болып табылды.

Осыған орай мақалада ел халқының тарихи даму жолында өзінің ізін қалдырған жеке тұлғаның қызметін зерттеу арқылы үлкен гуманистік міндетті жүзеге асыру міндеті қойылды. Себебі тарихи тұлғаға ұлттық көзқарас тұрғысынан баға беру ұлт тарихын құрметтеу мен отаншылдық сезімді қалыптастырады десек, сондай зерттеу объектісіне айналдыруға болатын тұлғаның бірі – Әбілмәмбет хан.

Сондықтан мақалада авторлар ХҮІІІ ғасырдағы ел билеген тарихи тұлға Әбілмәмбет Болатұлының саяси-қоғамдық қызметін ашып көрсететін факторлар ретінде қазақ-орыс, қазақ-жоңғар қатынастары, ондағы хан мақсаты, оның орта жүздің саяси-әлеуметтік жағдайына әсері, Кіші жүзбен өзара байланыстар, патшалықтың арнайы жіберілген шенеуніктері мен қазақ ақсүйек тобы өкілдерінің қызметіне талдау жасайды. Мақаланың жаңашылдығы бұл Әбілмәмбет ханның сыртқы саясатын жекелей алып қарастырған қазақ тіліндегі алғашқы зерттеу болып табылады. Нәтижеде авторлар Әбілмәмбет ханның сыртқы саясатының ерекшеліктері мен көпқырлығын нақты мысалдармен анықтайды.

Кілт сөздер: Әбілмәмбет, хан, саясат, дипломатия, Түркістан, жоңғар, стратегия.

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ИЗ ИСТОРИИ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ АБУЛМАМБЕТ ХАНА

Аннотация

Дипломатическая служба играет важную роль в сложном процессе государственного строительства. Становление дипломатической службы особенно проявилось во времена Казахского ханства. Развитие международных отношений и дипломатии Казахского ханства

не уступало по своему уровню сильным государствам, имеющим свое место в мировой системе, и являлось важным показателем государственности и независимости. Оно попадало под юрисдикцию ханов, правивших в Казахском ханстве, и считалось привилегией, признаваемой как народом страны, так и соседними государствами.

В данной статье ставится задача изучения деятельности личности, оставившей свой след в историческом развитии народа для реализации важной гуманистической задачи. Если говорить, что оценка исторической личности с национальной точки зрения порождает уважение к истории нации и чувство патриотизма, то одной из личностей, которую можно превратить в объект такого исследования является Абулмамбет-хан. В рамках статьи авторы анализируют казахско-русские, казахско-джунгарские отношения как факторы, раскрывающие политико-общественную деятельность Абулмамбет-хана – исторической личности, правившей страной в XVIII веке. Также рассмотрены цели хана во внешней политике, его влияние на социально-политическое положение Среднего жуза, взаимоотношения с Младшим жузом, а также дипломатическая деятельность специально подготовленных чиновников ханства и представителей казахской аристократической группы.

Научная новизна статьи заключается в том, что это первое исследование на казахском языке, в котором отдельно рассматривается внешняя политика Абулмамбет-хана. В ходе исследования авторы на конкретных примерах определяют особенности и многогранность внешней политики Абулмамбет-хана.

Ключевые слова Абулмамбет, хан, политика, дипломатия, Туркестан, джунгар, стратегия.

Introduction. At the beginning of the XVIII century, the Kazakh Khanate is experiencing serious difficulties in foreign and domestic policy. Fragmentation and discord, the struggle for economic and political power between the zhuzs hinder the strengthening of the Kazakh statehood. Such chaos is exacerbated by Dzungarian aggression. The loss of livestock and pasture lands, the destruction of migration routes and traditions, the decline in the craft profession and trade, the great and Middle zhuz are subject to economic stress. The decline in the population and territory under his rule weakened the power of the Khans and accelerated the political and territorial fragmentation of the Kazakh Khanate. In such a difficult situation, the ruling representatives, who wanted to preserve the Khanate and the integrity of the territory, begin to step forward. One of the rulers who occupies a place among such personalities is Abilmambet Khan. Information about the life of such figures helps to understand the diverse and complex system of international relations of the Kazakh khanates, which is freely distributed between the three centers of power: the Russian and Qin empires and the Islamic world. The Khans who ruled in Kazakh society and their activities were left out of research and distorted. In fact, in the modern geopolitical space, the preservation of the vast territory of Kazakhstan, as a country where the countries of the world are considered, is the result of the wisdom and foresight of the rulers of this Great Steppe, the skill of diplomacy of the rulers of the steppes. The steppe rulers, as powerful empires of that time, withstood the pressure of the Russian Kingdom and the Qin Empire, the Dzungarian state and the influence of internal strife, while maintaining the integrity of the national and land territory. Among them, Abilmambet Khan, the grandson of Tauke Khan, who came from the surname of the main Kazakh Khans, who was recognized by Abylai, Baba tutkan, will also take a special place.

Materials. The volume of Special Research on the foreign policy and diplomacy of individual Kazakh Khans in the late Middle Ages and modern times is very narrow. There is only a collection of partial studies and documents on international relations, which studied relations with different countries. The history of the foreign policy of the Kazakh Khans was reflected in the works of R.B.Suleimenov, V.Ya. From the work of V.Moiseev, information can be obtained regarding Kazakh-Dzungarian relations, the policy of Abilmambet Khan in it.

In the works of Zh.Kassymbayev, N.Mukametkanovich and others, issues of relations between the Kazakh zhuzs and neighboring states are discussed. In the work of I.V.Erofeeva, there are data on the relations of Abulkhair and Abilmambet Khan, who were contemporary rulers.

Among the new data, the works of E.Sadykov and A.Mukhtar, K.Sh.Hafizova, K.Abuev, A.K.Akhmetov are of great importance.

In the study of the topic, along with domestic researchers, the study of the Japanese researcher Jin Noda "the Kazakh Khanate between the Russian and Qin empires", in addition to providing an analysis of the problem of Khanate power, citizenship, general research, examines the issues of the relationship of the Kazakh Khanate with the Russian state and the Qin Empire.

These studies add new information to the series of facts related to Abilmambet Khan as one of the key figures of the Kazakh Khanate in the XVIII century. Referring to the fact that in the studies we have highlighted, the identity of Abilmambet Khan to the Khan's family, his socio-political activities are described, it can be noted that it is important to consider the main positions and directions of his policy in foreign policy as a separate analytical work. His activities are generally related to the activities of contemporaries, such as Abulkhair Khan, as well as to the general problems of the Kazakh Khanate.

In the process of writing the article, a collection of documentary materials, published written data, research materials were used. To study the topic, information from a number of scientific literature was analyzed.

Among the documentary materials are the XVI-XVIII centuries. we used the materials of the collection of documents on Kazakh-Russian relations, the collection of Eastern diplomacy within civilizations, Chinese details about Kazakhstan. These materials are real sources.

Materials and methods. In the course of the study, we relied on the principle of historicity, which consists in studying the problem in its development and the relationship of historical events and phenomena from the position of maximum objectivity. In the analysis of issues related to the study of Kazakh-Russian, Kazakh-Dzungarian and Kazakh-Chinese diplomatic relations under abilmambet Khan, along with general scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis, comparison, historical methods of cognition were used. For example, historical and typological methods were used to describe the development of events in historical-comparative, mutual relations in chronological order, which reveal the features of the emergence of diplomatic dialogue and confrontation between states, allowing to compare the methods and means used by the rulers and ambassadors in it.

The use of these methods made it possible to determine the historical situation in the studied period, determine the main goals and directions of the foreign policy of the state and embassy relations, compare and characterize the level of diplomatic skills of the rulers, and especially reveal the features of the position of Abilmambet Khan in foreign policy.

One of the largest officials of the Orenburg Province, P.I.Rychkov, in his work reflects the reasons that prompted the small and Middle zhuz Khans to accept Russian citizenship, the purpose of Abilmambet in it. In the work of A.I.Levshin, one can also see the Khan's actions in the process of joining Kazakhstan to Russia. Among the data materials published within the framework of the state program «cultural heritage» there are records of K.Miller's visit to Tashkent and the Dzungarian Khanate, who received the title of poruchik, and then major. The works of these authors are considered historical sources left by people who saw the events of that time.

Among the studies related to the personality of Abilmambet and his descendants, socio-political activities, one can single out the works of Doctor of historical sciences A.K.Mukhtar and information in his monographs «the Kazakh Khanate of the XVIII-XIX centuries», co-authored with E.B.Sadykov, as well as in the research of K.Sh.Hafizov.

Therefore, the scientific research and data considered by us fully prove that there is a reason to analyze and evaluate the foreign policy position of Abilmambet Khan.

Results and Discussion. The increase in the power of the Russian Empire, the strengthening of the power of the Qin dynasty in China, the expansion and lateral compression of the spheres of influence of these two large states have a great impact on international relations in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region. Each of these powers develops a more specific plan for strengthening its course in relation to Kazakhstan.

It is in this difficult period for the Kazakhs that the threat of losing independence comes to the historical Arena Abilmambet. Abilmambet, who has been Khan since his Six Grandfathers, was not only the most famous branch of the Genghis family in the Kazakh people, but also the highest representative in rank. Personal organizational skills, political foresight and genius, courage and other qualities, coming out of the noble family, the support of the most influential Kazakh people elevate him to the rank of Khan. Thanks to this, he achieves success in domestic and foreign policy related to the strengthening of statehood and Khan's power in the Kazakh Khanate.

The question of the election of Khan is one of the most important issues of ancient times. According to K. Abuyev, there is an archival fact that the year of birth of Abilmambet Khan was about 1690, and the election of the Khan was 1739[1,88p]. It is indicated as different years of the Khan's election: 1730, 1734, 1739, 1748. These dates are associated with the presence of events that affected the position of the elevation of the authority of the grandson of Tauke Khan. In traditional nomadic Kazakh society, the title of Khan was given different meanings. Initially, he meant the right to lead an army during the war. In this regard, Abilmambet's biography shows his participation in the battle with the dzungarians in 1730 and 1734. From that moment on, Khan received the right to keep his personal seal, which was engraved with the word Bahadur Khan, the name of which Mullah Azan called.

At the next stage of career development, the Khan was elected a ruler who, along with military issues, was decisive in the internal issues of managing the clans enshrined in certain territories. At this time, the tribes had permanent seasonal migrations, and their rulers-winter fortresses. The fortress of abilmambet throughout the entire period of his Khanate was Turkestan, and in some years there were cases when he lost it or occupied only a part of it. The Fraternal tribes expanded at the expense of marriage and other alliances of the Kazakh upper classes. Abilmambet headed the Kipchaks, kongyrat, uak, Kerey and atygai clan units of the argyn tribe, which were given to him as the creation of his godmother, as well as the naimans and Abak-Kerey. When the sons grew up, according to tradition, Abilmambet gave them a share. Although the firstborn gave Bolat his name in northern Kazakhstan, Abylai grew stronger here. Therefore, it was attached to the Bulat, and after the death of his father, he inherited it.

The third date, which occupied an important place in the biography of abilmambet, is 1739. This is the time associated with the election of Abilmambet as Khan. During the establishment of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, the Russian Kingdom received information about Abilmambet through the ambassadors of Abulkair and his letters. Abilmambet Khan is mentioned among them when it comes to the Kazakh rulers located on the territory from the Syrdarya, Sarysu, Turgai rivers to Kishitau and Ulytau. It is said that in his power there are the cities of Tashkent, Turkestan and Sairam. At a certain time, Abilmambet received a large income from the settlements of Turkestan: Sauran, Otyrar, Syganak, etc. Evidence of his election to the Khan was found in the journal entry of Prince V. Urusov, who conducted direct negotiations with Abilmambet in 1740, «abilmambet is the grandson of Bolat Khan and last year Khan was elected in Turkestan on behalf of Argyn, Aktai and Wakkerei and other well-known Kyrgyz-kaisak tribes... it is described as»[2, 148p].

As we can see from this information, the ceremony of election of Abilmambet consisted of two stages: first he was elected ruler of the Turkestan ualay, then he was seated on a white felt in the horde of his subordinate argyn, uak-Kerey. He directly contributed to the rise of batyr Niyaz Abilmambet to the Khan's throne in Turkestan. In fact, Abilmambet's rule in Turkestan was opposed by the descendants of Semeke Khan. His election was associated with the fact that Abilmambet led a detachment formed from his subordinates in the war with the oirats in 1738 and the death of his brother Sameke. During the reign of Sameke, he had a great power. This is evidenced by The Diary of the visit of the guide Karl Miller from Orenburg to Tashkent between August 29, 1738 and June 5, 1739. In it, Miller reports that on October 26, together with the merchants, he met Abilmambet Sultan, who was summoned to Turkestan so that his cousin Sameke died and was elected Khan in his place, promising to protect the Russian caravans going to Tashkent. Podporuchik A. Kushelev, who was next to Miller, also writes that he met Abilmambet in Turkestan, but did not accept the

Khanate by inheritance. In connection with the question of General V.A.Urusov on the issue of being elected Khan, Niyaz batyr said that «Khans are always elected both by inheritance and by kinship. If the Sultan who is a relative does not meet the Khan's Authority, another Sultan who is considered worthy can be elected» [2,155p].

Therefore, one can fully agree with the statement of the Kazakh historian A.Mukhtar that Abilmambet Bolatovich ascended the Khan's throne in 1739 [3, 99].

The period of Abilmambet's reign is associated with important events in the history of the Kazakh country. The priority of relations with the Dzungarians in Abilmambet's diplomatic activities was associated with the policy of the dzungar rulers towards the Kazakhs. Because in 1739 with 24 thousand hands, in the winter of 1739-1740 with 30-35 thousand hands, the Kalmyks began to attack the countries of Abilmambet, Abylai, Barak from three sides: the Septen arm from the north, the Yellow Manzhi from the south, and the Lama Dorzhi from the middle, rising to the Or river, the main goal was to conquer the middle zhuz. The Kazakh tribes facing Abilmambet Khan and Barak Sultan between the Irtysh and Ishim rivers suffer heavy losses. In 1740, Abulkhair sent an ambassador to Kaldan Seren in search of a truce. Due to the resistance of the middle zhuz, the army led by Sary Manzhi spends the winter on the Kazakh land.

During such a difficult period, Abilmambet, who was accompanied by his father Bulat and Tolebi, grew up and followed the policy of Tolebi in the administration of the country, which was aimed at relying on Russia in the war against Kalmykia. His first attempt at such a policy took place in Orenburg in 1740, when he took an oath in Orenburg, agreeing to be loyal to the Russians as allies. Taking with him 128 Rubas and sultans of the middle zhuz, he takes an oath to the Tsarist representative V.A.Urusov, declaring his consent to be with the Russian. Among those who came with Abilmambet to meet with Russian bureaucrats, the most reliable were the batyr Niyaz and Sultan Abylai. On August 28, 1740, V.A.Urusov met the middle zhuz Khan Abilmambet and his brother Abylai Sultan. In his report to the Russian Foreign Affairs Board on September 8, he reports that the middle zhuz Kazakhs of Khan and Abylai Sultan were sworn in and taken under the Tsar of Russia, and the Khan and Sultan were handed certificates.

That's what Rychkov said about it he said: «...After greeting and greeting, Abilmambet Khan placed on the right side of the portrait of His Majesty the ruler, Abylai with Lieutenant General on the left side and swore, after the tradition of swearing, they kissed the Koran and raised it above their heads... After the Khan and the Sultan were congratulated by the staff officers, the 128 rubas and sultans who came with them took the oath in another tent...» [4,26p].

Of course, there is no doubt that the Kazakh rulers, when they swore by the Koran, actually begged for the well-being of the Kazakh people, and there was an act of desperation that asked for a way out of the difficulties they faced. The situation that forced the Khan and the Sultan to swear allegiance to the Russian Empire was the search for a reliable support in the fight against the destructive attacks of the Kalmyks in the East. This is what Kasymbayev said, «but I don't know. The oath of Abylai and Abilmambet was intended to bring the political situation closer to Russia and weaken the Dzungarian attacks against the Middle zhuz» showed [5,18p].

During the period under review, the inter-domestic political forces were also complicated. While Abulkhair Khan was close to Russia, Barak Sultan and many rulers of the Naiman clan went to diplomatic actions with Orenburg, but could not completely break away from the Dzungars. As a major center of power in the region's international relations, the Dzungarian Khanate also exerted its influence on the Kazakh Khanate. In foreign policy affairs, the influence of Abulkhair prevailed, he kept embassy contacts with the main images of the region in his hands. It was also facilitated by the economic situation of Abulkhair, the tribes dependent on him and the size of the controlled territory [6,232p]. In this regard, Abilmambet, like many Kazakh rulers, considered Abulkhair a worthy person who could lead the Kazakh troops and organize a fight against external enemies. The fact that during negotiations with the commander of the Orenburg expedition, Lieutenant General Prince V.Urusov, he did not allow a single negative comment on Abulkhair Khan indicates this.

Abilmambet sought to come to an agreement with Abulkhair, as well as with his sons, on the most important points of his relationship with Russia. Abulkhair did not want to be isolated from important

negotiations, and although he did not come, he personally contributed to it and sent Abulmambet to meet with the commander of the Orenburg expedition and his two eldest sons. These actions showed that the rulers who ruled the two zhuz were unanimous in the common interest, regardless of their own interests.

Abilmambet Khan is well prepared for the Orenburg negotiations. The vast majority of his speech was related to all three hundred. The issues were as follows:

Return or reimbursement of goods plundered by Kazakhs who were sent from Orenburg to Tashkent in 1738;

Returning the prisoners, Zhanibek batyr was the first to give a list of Kazakhs and their cattle, driven by Cossacks and Kalmyks, and he himself took basybay Tatars, nogais, Kalmyks from Astrakhan and Orenburg to Russians and Russia in order to avenge them, and sold them into slavery to Khiva and Bukhara;

About the preparation of a new Russian caravan and its escort with support from the Kazakhs, where the Kazakhs believed that to ensure safety, it was not enough for merchants to pay two pieces of leather for one cargo on a camel. As a result, Tashkent agreed to pay in kopecks [7,43 p].

Abulmambet wished to send an embassy from two or three trusted people to the palace of the Princess. The Russian side offered to send more celebrities, so as not to return the Princess audience, and expressed the desire to give her children bail. Moreover, it was known to Abulmambet that in 1732 Abulkhair kept the first embassy in Orenburg, he was 11-12-year-old Yeraly Sultan, and then the Khan voluntarily and forcibly replaced him with another son. The Russian side knew no other way to avoid the unfriendly actions of the Kazakhs than to obtain guarantees and keep in custody the brothers, children, parents and other relatives of the rulers: Khans, Sultans and batyrs.

At the same time, Abilmambet offered the Russian side not to keep the Kazakh people in Orenburg, but to keep them in Samara, under the guise of his special services.

At this time, Abulkhair sought to ask the Russian side to build a fortress in the Syrdarya and replace the family's hostages with the trust of the Middle Zhuz. Abulmambet did not agree with either of them. He did not take into account the fact that Russia would have real military assistance in the fight against the Dzungarian Khanate, and gave hope that the Russian side would also support it only by diplomatic methods. Abulmambet offered Abulkhair to send his eldest son and heir, Nuraly Sultan, to Russia as a hostage. Thus, the senior wanted to demoralize the Khan. In any case, the main obstacle to the alliance of the two was the fact that Abulmambet did not want to lose Turkestan or give it to Abulkhair. Because the city of Turkestan has served as the permanent capital of Kazakhstan since the XU century, and the possession of this city, along with its high status, had a great political significance. When abylyai was released from captivity, Kaldan Seren offered Abylai the power of the Turkestan city under his control, but he transferred power to Abilmambet through negotiations. This strengthens the political position of Abulmambet [8, 99 p].

Basically, during this period, the position of Russia in the west and north of Kazakhstan prevailed, in the south and East – the position of the Dzungarian Khanate. The Khans of the great zhuz were under the Protectorate of the Dzungarian Khanate. Abilmambet repeatedly stated this at a meeting in Orenburg. Abulmambet realized that through Dzungaria he could leave Turkestan and the villages dependent on him. He was fully convinced of this in half a year after the formal adoption of the Russian oath. This was the first and last meeting of Abulmambet in the territory controlled by Russia. After that, the ambassadors were received only on their own land. He did not break ties with Orenburg, nor did he leave the letters of Russian namestniks unanswered.

Although he received the obligation of subordination, none of the response letters to him did not fit into the accepted form. A copy of Abilmambet's letters to Anna Ionovna and Elizaveta Petrovna has been preserved in the Foreign Affairs Collegium. But the seal placed aroused great doubts in the experienced translator R.Urazin. R.Urazin wrote about him that «at the end of the appendix there is an ink stamp, it is difficult to distinguish what is depicted on it» [9,321p]. Thus, although Abulmambet Khan promised to send a special embassy, the Dzungarian case was important for his authorities in terms of specific results.

Moreover, the attack of the oirats in February 1741 made a significant change in the situation. This led to a change in the main forces of the Kazakhs in favor of the Dzungarian Khanate, on the other hand, during this period, Russia was in trouble with Palace strife over its internal throne issues and, in August, the Swedish declaration of war turned the Russian forces away from the East. Russia also acted with unfriendly intentions and in September 1742 banned the passage of Kazakhs through the Urals. The Kazakhs had to move only on the field surface and not approach the Russian fortress. At the same time, the rivalry between Abulkhair and Abilmambet also intensifies.

In this situation, Abilmambet, adhering to the goal of consolidating his position through the Kalmyks, proposes to the ruler of kalmak, Donduk-Dasha, to restore friendly relations, as in the days of Ayuke Khan. He said, «if you ask for our side, we are on this side of the Urals by the grace of God with the whole horde, and we wish you to be on the other side of the Urals with all the people. Both hordes are strictly forbidden to catch thieves, and there will be no theft or invasion on our side, you need to do the same and leave the war completely», the letter falls into the hands of the Russian administration under an unknown circumstances. This thought of him contradicted Abulkhair's attempts to move between the Urals and the Volga.

Soon Abilmambet sent ambassadors to the secret adviser I.I.Neplyuev, as well as to the Astrakhan Governor V.N.Tatishchev, expressing confidence that the Kazakhs would not steal in the Urals. On November 12, 1742, Khan Abilmambet promises to send his real ambassadors to Russia «in the coming spring» [10,174-175pp).

Following the policy of his followers, the governor of Orenburg I.I.Neplyuev, believing that there is no higher risk from abilmambet Khan, who is more concerned with relations with the dzungarians than Abulkhair, gives more support to the ambassadors of the middle zhuz Khan.

The Dzungarian offensive in winter-spring 1741 again caused trouble, the Kazakh land was invaded by galdan-Tseren troops, and Sultan Abylai was captured. Abilmambet, together with his entourage, is looking for a way out of the current situation. In order to prevent the dzungars from completely subjugating the country, Abilmambet in the summer of 1741 sent the embassy led by Usora to Kaldan Serena for negotiations.

Kaldan Seren makes several demands during the negotiations. They are:

- Demand that abilmambet Khan, Barak Sultan and other rulers and chief elders emigrate to Turkestan;
- The request of the bi-Sultans, led by Abulkhair Khan, to entrust their children;
- From each smoke of the middle and small zhuz, collect one belly and send it to Dzungaria;
- The hero, who struck Dzungaria with Karasakal, demanded that the Sultan explain his actions;
- Protection of trade routes Russia-Khiva-Tashkent;
- there was a demand for the return of Karasakal, who falsely claimed to be the son of a settler, Shuna hero [11,79-80 pp].

The ambassadors of Abilmambet returned to the country together with the Dzungarian ambassador in the spring of 1742. Then about a thousand and a half good people of the younger and Middle zhuz gather and hold a meeting. The council discusses in detail the demands of stopping the enemy, returning prisoners, and Dzungaria. He decides to give the trust despite the fact that there are partial disputes. This decision is not to the liking of the Russian side and attempts are made to take various measures of resistance.

In 1742, the Russian government sent a translator, Mr. R. Urazin, to persuade the Middle zhuz Khan Abilmambet to congratulate Elizabeth on her accession to the throne. The purpose of the Russian government here was to repeat the oath of the Kazakhs before the new ruler [2,216 p]. There was also negotiations with Kaldan Seren to release Abylai, who surrendered to Russia, from the captivity of the oirats.

In 1742, Abilmambet asked Queen Elizabeth not to keep her ambassadors: Aitym batyr, Karabash, Bulat, Karaman. They were sent to congratulate Elizaveta Petrovna on her accession to the throne and confirm the Khan's faith in loyalty. After returning from the negotiations near Orsk, the Kazakh rulers in loyalty to the Russian were subjected to great trials. The ambassadors of

Abilmambet reported on the state of Kazakh-Dzungarian Affairs, asked for protection from the oirats, expressed their intention to consolidate trade and escort and protect the Central Asian and Russian trade caravans. On June 23, 1742, Elizabeth was given a certificate of return home with her comrades [2, 217p]. The Kazakh ambassadors will receive a special gift from the Queen on the way back.

At this time, according to Orenburg, Abilmambet moved to the same mouth of the Urals –on the upper reaches of the Ilek River. According to the instructions given to the translator of the Orenburg Commission R. Urazin on July 7, 1742, he was given the task of persuading Abilmambet to come to Orenburg to meet with the secret adviser Neptyuev and to obtain information from his own lips about the relations of the Middle zhuz with Dzungaria [2,216 p].

The Russian side, along with Abilmambet, sends individual certificates to the Sultans Barak and Batyr sultans who came to the council in the event of their arrival to the council through the translator. But without informing about the certificates, he decides to hand it to each one individually. The task of R.Urazin in this place was to use all his strength to return the Kazakh rulers from the desire to entrust Kaldan to Serena. Together with R.Urazin, Siberian Ivan Lapin, who lived among the Kazakhs for a long time, mastered the Kazakh language. Basically, when analyzing the situation in relations at this time, it becomes clear that the position of the Russian Kingdom in relation to the Kazakhs was bilateral. On the one hand, it was supposed to protect the interests of the Kazakhs as their subjects, and on the other hand, it was to prevent the Kazakh rulers from compromising among themselves in order to reach a peace agreement with the oirats. Nevertheless, in accordance with the decision taken, abilmambet Khan in August 1742 sent his second child Abulpeyiz to Dzungaria with the addition of Niyaz batyr [12,203p]. R.Urazin says that Abilmambet sent his son not to Amanat, but to see Abylai and to establish peace between the Kazakh-Dzungarian and solve the problem of settlement and pastures, and Kaldan Seren openly admitted that he was going to give Turkestan and 32 cities in addition. [2,124-125pp].

In fact, the main reason why Kaldan Seren freed Abylai from captivity was to make his ally the main ruler of the middle and great zhuz, his trustee. And the Russian government did not like Abilmambet's attempt to stabilize his situation, entrusting Dzungaria to him. During this period, the head of Orenburg I. I. Neptyuev intends to capture Abilmambet himself and his sons, who did not come to the Kazakh-Russian negotiations of August 23-30, 1742. Neptyuev himself openly says that by keeping his son in custody, it is a very effective way to control not only the Khans, but also the Sultans, the entire people.

Abilmambet, who did not offer full recognition to the actions of the Russian government, sent back the embassy led by Zhapek batyr, and in June 1743 the embassy released Abylai and returned to the country. I.I.Neptyuev reports that Abilmambet gave his son and, believing the promise of the dzungars, became too close with them. The dzungars also believed that they had legally established their influence on the Kazakhs by obtaining trust [13,63p].

It can be assumed that abilmambet Khan pursued an intermediate policy between the two empires and pursued his own interests, and the empires adopted the issue of citizenship from the point of view of their position.

Despite the efforts of the Russian government to prevent agreements between Abilmambet Khan and other sultans, Abilmambet was consulting with Barak, Abylai and other influential Sultans. In most cases, the Khan assigned them a specific case. For example, with the consent of Abilmambet, Abylai was first engaged in security, and then in international affairs. When he is released from captivity, he gives the task of managing the argyans and establishes contact with a number of Dzungarian rulers.

At the same time, it is noted that Abilmambet himself needed Abylai's business and performance skills and the authority of Barak, who ruled many tribes in the south and east of Kazakhstan and could communicate directly with the dzungars. Since Barak had a strong direct connection with the dzungars in that period, no case against the dzungars could be resolved without the consent of Barak Sultan. Abylai and Barak also often visited the Khan and communicated through ambassadors about important internal and external orders regarding the territories in their possessions.

For Abilmambet Khan, the need for contact with the dzungaris was directly related to the issue of territory in relation to Turkestan and the Syrdarya region, which he owned. Abilmambet Khan, who well understood the strategic and economic importance of the Syrdarya cities for the Kazakhs, understood that it was possible to rule the region with the support of the Dzungarian Khan. Therefore, in order for him to keep Turkestan, which was the fortress of Khan during the reign of his grandfather Tauke Khan, in his hands, Abilmambet also had to take political steps, such as turning it into a temporary vassal of the Dzungarian Khanate and sharing the revenues from the city itself and its surrounding regions with Central Asian rulers and internal competitors.

Orenburg Governor A.I. Tevkelev and his assistant P.I. Rychkov reported to the Russian Foreign Affairs Board on the situation in the middle and small zhuz. For example, Abilmambet left the Horde and in 1743 «inhabited Turkestan, owned the city itself and other lands (inhabited by Sarts and working people who were merchants)». In 1758, Khan returns to the Horde, because he is expelled from the city by his cousin eSIM. But the Khan does not agree with him, this problem is solved by Abylai, who has a good relationship with the name. After Abylai reconciles the two, Abilmambet returns to Turkestan. In August 1758, Tevkelev reports that the Khan left the Horde and lived in Turkestan. As well as the geographer, researcher of the Kazakh region, the Russian chinovnik P.I. Rychkov «...for his own peace, he moved from the Horde to Turkestan. He has no objections to the Russian side» [7,50p]. Such reports indicate that the Khan, having secured his abode, regained the status of the Khan, which he had held for decades.

In the middle zhuz, Abilmambet's transfer of his son Abilpeyiz to Dzungaria solved two difficult problems. One is the release of Abylai Sultan from captivity, the other is the recapture of cities in the Turkestan region by the Kazakhs. Abilmambet Khan told the ambassadors Likhachev and Urazin from Orenburg about his situation: «Russia has no help, no defense. And Kaldan Seren, on the other hand, annexed the former power of Turkestan with 32 nearby cities. If I don't give Kaldan my child, then we will have to fight, and if I do, will the Russians be able to stand up for us? No!» [9,270 p].

The position of Abilmambet in that time and his position in society are fully confirmed by documents for 25 years, especially the Journal Record of the negotiations of the Orenburg governorate with the Khans and sultans of the small and Middle zhuz in August 1740, the meeting of ambassadors who visited China on behalf of Abilmambet Khan in 1764, Qianlong's response letter to the Khan. These documents show that the position of Abilmambet Khan was also strong in the external Arena. Both the oirat, Central Asian Khans, Russia and the Qin Empire recognized Abilmambet as a dominant person in the status of the Khanate and treated him on an equal footing. As a Khan, he did not settle in one place, but traveled through the settlements of Turkestan and spent almost half of the year on the lands of Northern, Eastern and central Kazakhstan. Such a method of power was effective for the nomadic State, for the recognition of the ruler by the people.

Among Abilmambet's confidants in the conduct of his policy were his stepson Abilpeiz, Abylai Sultan, his son Bolat, Kazybek and his sons Bekbolat and Syrymbet, Kuleke batyr and his son Kulsary batyr. The Khan, considering the suggestions and opinions of these Sultan-batyr, also persuaded his influential people to take into account his own opinion. In addition, with their support, the son was able to strengthen the position of Steel in the North and Abulpeyiz in the East. This was especially evident in the solution of external problems between Abilmambet and Abylai. For example, in their research, a number of researchers note that while Abilmambet's Khanate status was preserved, Abylai's growing influence was tried to be used by Russian officials, who aimed to turn the Kazakh land into their sphere of influence and strengthen it [14,106p]. However, Abylai, who respected Abilmambet as his father, insisted that Abilmambet, who «considers himself a father», would offer his neck to the Khan, constantly resolving the issue within the Khanate in agreement. Thus, Abylai himself, as a confidant of Abilmambet, not only understood his place in the ranks of power, but also clearly demonstrated the need for the principle of joint decision-making in the foreign policy and relations of the Khanate.

In general, in his foreign policy position, Abilmambet Khan, adhering to the goal of not breaking ties with the Dzungars, after Kaldan Seren's death, he did not advocate the internal strife of the

country, the actions of the Kazakh sultans, who supported the competitors of Kaldan Seren's legitimate successor.

The years 1748-1749 indicate the formal domination of Abilmambet over other Kazakh khanates, a long stay on the Khan's throne, in the practice of Economic, economic and political management. Despite the provocative actions of Russia, Abilmambet pursues an effective policy for his power, as a politician he gains considerable authority, putting him on a par with Abulkair, who is associated with Russia, the Dzungarian, and the southern khanates.

Especially during this period, together with Abylai, Abilmambet contributes to the internal policy of Dzungaria. In connection with the internal struggle of Dzungaria and the defeat of the noyans in the course of the coup, Davatsi and Amirsana fled to the Kerei tribes and took refuge. Knowing about this situation, the Russian government believed that in the future Davatsi could ally with the Kazakhs if he became the ruler of Dzungaria, which was contrary to Russian interests.

In 1752, in response to the demand of the Dzungarian ruler Lama-Dorji to return the noyans, Abilmambet Khan proposed the need to return to avoid a new conflict. But a number of Sultans and batyrs support the game «noyans are useful for Kazakhs». Abylai sends an ambassador to the Dzungarian ruler with the fact that he cannot return them due to the voluntary arrival of the noyans. In 1752, a meeting of Kazakh leaders and batyrs was held in Karkaraly on the site of Kaiyinsau, the purpose of which was to unite the country against the growing threat of Kalmyk. Despite the fact that the meeting was organized by Abylai, it was carried out through an agreement with Abilmambet, because the proof of this was that the meeting did not raise the issue of abilmambet's abdication, moreover, Abylai did not show a desire to take the throne from his brother abilmambet, whom he respected during his lifetime [15,127p]. This gathering will lead to a new Kazakh-Dzungarian war. Abylai wins the war and soon takes the throne of Davatsi to replace the murdered Lama-Dorji. He sent an ambassador who wanted to live at peace with the Kazakhs, and the struggle between him and Amirsana led to the defeat of Amirsana, receiving support from China, and the defeat of the Dzungarian Khanate with the Chinese army.

The fall of Dzungaria will allow Kazakh-Chinese relations to be established. Abilmambet and Abylai instruct Abulpayiz to negotiate with the Chinese located on the border. Abilpaiz proposes to the Chinese to carry out a peace treaty and trade relations. Accepting the offer, the Chinese send Ambassador Dalika [1,127p].

Thus, Kazakh-Chinese relations begin in foreign policy. As the first Kazakh ambassadors, Abilpeiz and Abylai went to China on August 30, 1757. The embassy's request was to return Tarbagatai. Bogda Khan gives Abylai an edikt with the seal of the Qin Kingdom, which allowed his son to emigrate to the Altai Mountains in the area where the Kalmyks who fled to Russia lived. As a return to him, the country of China demands the return of Amirsana. He is informed that Abylai Amirsana is not in his country [16,13-14pp]. Under the pretext of searching for amirsana, the Chinese collect information about the Kazakh rulers.

In late 1758 and early 1759, the Chinese Ambassador Navan arrives with 11 ambassadors. And in February 1759, Abilmambet, as an ambassador, sent the Russian Sultan to the king of Qin.

Thus, the problem of relations with the Qin Empire in foreign policy developed with the actions of the Qin Empire in relation to the Kazakhs and dzungars, in connection with the Kazakh-Kyrgyz tensions. Since 1762, the Qin empire has established a border with nomadic Kazakhs and carried out several military actions to clear the border territories. It also provides for the establishment of a fortress along the Ili River and in Tarbagatai. From this policy of the Chinese empire, the tribes that migrated to the East and southeast of Kazakhstan, under the rule of Abilpeyiz and his sons, Kazbek bi, Kozhabergen, Kabanbai batyrs, suffer. One of Abulpeyiz's wives and Kozhabergen batyr are captured. He gives recommendations for the return of Refugee oirats to the lands liberated from the Kazakhs. Also, the conquest of East Turkestan by the Chinese empire, the call of the Uyghur Lords to protect their descendants to the leaders of Muslim countries led to the strengthening of the religious factor in international relations. This is also influenced by the lack of unity between the Central Asian Khans on this issue.

And in 1763, the Russian Empire also put pressure on the Kazakhs on the territory and banned the use of pastures on the right banks of the Urals and Irtysh. In this situation, on the one hand, the conflict with the Qin Empire, on the other hand, the Russian ban on grazing in the Urals and Irtysh, the spread of epidemics in the Syrdarya and the emergence of anthrax outbreaks in the Irtysh region, the addition of natural disasters, along with other Kazakh Khan-Sultans, put Abilmambet in a dead end. Shah Ahmet of the Durrani state, who intended to use the crisis in the internal situation of the Kazakh Khanate to create an anti-Cine coalition, sent ambassadors to the Central Asian Khans and sent a letter to Abilmambet Khan with a proposal to join the ghazawat against irreligious shurshites. Abilmambet, who always intends to solve internal problems together with other Khan-Sultans around him, sends invaders to familiarize other Khan-Sultans with the letter of Ahmet Shah and gathers to consult with everyone. This meeting, which gathered 6 thousand people, was held in Turkestan, which shows that the Kazakh rulers maintained internal unity in the Afghan issue [17,17p].

In general, in the diplomatic relations of the Kazakh Khanate with neighboring countries, the Kazakh Khans set themselves certain tasks on the basis of the rights to determine the country's foreign policy course [18,139 p]. Abilmambet Khan also shows that by doing this, the Kazakh Khanate fulfilled its task, which arose on the basis of the rights of one of the Kazakh Khans to determine the country's foreign policy course in its diplomatic relations with neighboring countries. Realizing that it is impossible to act individually on your own under all-round pressure, the council comes to the following decision:

First of all, inform the Nuraly and Kayip Khans about the current situation in External Relations and all related steps and agree with them. With the help of them and the Central Asian Khans, it is believed that it is necessary to contact Ahmet Shah, because there is a response to the sent letter. Secondly, sending a letter to the Russian and Qing leaders of Russia and China demanding the return of captured people and stolen livestock, as well as sending joint ambassadors to the capitals of these states [7,54p].

Thus, Abilmambet, together with other Khan-Sultans, goes to political actions and diplomatic steps, pursuing the goal of resolving the current situation at his own discretion. This means unity and integrity among the representatives of the ruling Country at that time.

In this case, Abilmambet, in cooperation with other Khan-Sultans, gives priority to solving his problem by agreeing with Russia and the Qin Empire. But if this state does not fulfill their requirements, that is, the Chinese do not refuse to attack the Kazakhs of Tarbagatai and Ili, and the Russians do not put pressure on the Kazakhs of Siberia and the Western region, they will respond to the call of Akhmet Shah and decide to go to the holy war. The Kazakh Khans also took into account the need to warn China about the proposal of the Afghan Shah, and Abilmambet Khan prepares an embassy of United representatives.

In response to the letter of Abilmambet Khan on April 8, 1762, in response to the pressure of the border Qin rulers on the Kazakhs, Emperor Qianlong said: «Kazakh merchants brought Abilmambet's letter, written in a shortcut. The main point of the letter is that our detachments ask to return the captured people and cattle, and then go and fight. Only recently, Agui announced that he had sent a detachment led by Iletu to drive out the Kazakhs who crossed the border. He hasn't returned yet. We will do the same as last year, we will continue what we started. Kazakhs asked not to capture people and animals, but this year we intend to persecute them again, and then threaten them» [7,55p].

Agui orders Abilmambet to return the captured people and cattle, for which he sends Fengan and two guards officers. In addition, Abilmambet said: «You, Kazakhs, violated the border with cattle, the Ili commanders reported this to the Great Emperor, you nevertheless continued the crime, in connection with which they asked to punish you again. However, in honor of your recent submission, the emperor has ordered you to pardon. Then keep your people at bay and live quietly on your land. If you do this again, we will punish the generals as they propose» [7,56]. But the Uyghur uprising of 1765 changed the situation, and with the arrival of Kazakhs in the guise of merchants, the Qin Emperor, having considered all the options for action, decided to stay in East

Turkestan, reduce the pressure on the Kazakhs, and transfer the army across the border to East Turkestan. Kazakhs are allowed to pay rent for wintering in the territory belonging to the Ili governor-general. Although Ahmed Shah's conceived plan did not work out, it can be assumed that he contributed to the foreign policy steps of that time to a certain extent [19,177,187pp].

During the last reign of Abilmambet Khan, the struggle and rivalry between the descendants of Abilmambet, Barak and Abylai for the throne will also affect international relations. In foreign policy, the descendants of Abilmambet and Barak act in agreement with each other, while Abylai is left alone and acts individually. Abylai took a bilateral position with the Russian Queen Catherine II and the Qing Emperor Qianlong, at the same time, taking the same action and making the same promises. For example, in 1769, Beijing receives the ambassador of Abulpeyiz and his infant son Jochi. At the same time, Abylai also sends his firstborn, 28-year-old Valisultan, to Beijing with a bang dance and other confidants, thus, for the first time in the history of the Kazakh Khanate, giving his eldest son to Amanat, ahead of his competitors in the political struggle. Also at this time, Syrymbet, the son of the influential Kazybek bi, takes the Russian oath in Omsk. Such actions in the political arena meant the weakening of Abilmambet's influence as a senior Khan or that he was in a state of illness. Although the partial mention of Abilmambet from 1766 to 1769 indicates that he had no influence in real power, foreign policy. Due to the instability of the internal situation and the deterioration of the foreign policy situation, there are opinions that the Kazakhs kept the absence of the senior Khan secret. In fact, since 1764, Abilmambet has transferred true power to Abylai, and he himself deals with internal issues and acts as an adviser.

Conclusion. Thus, the materials of the analysis and research fully prove that Abilmambet was not excluded from the work of internal and external negotiations, determining the foreign policy direction of the state, as well as the rule of a certain territory, which is one of the fundamental rights and activities of the Khan's power. In some literature, the fact that the Sultan was mentioned along with the influential Khans of that time and adhered to his own principles in domestic and foreign policy, the fact that the Khan was elected in historical sources fully proves that he was a senior Khan. The personal, tribal relations, everyday life, foresight and culture, respect for traditions, which are characteristic of most Kazakh Khans, were also characteristic of Abilmambet Khan. It is obvious that Abilmambet's foreign policy strategy was strong under the rule of the Khanate, the main direction of which was to preserve Turkestan and its region as the center of the Khanate. At the same time, in the foreign policy direction of his reign, he used in foreign policy an element of a multi-vector course of foreign policy, adhering to normal relations with the Russian Empire, Dzungaria, which became an influential force of that time, and at the end of his life with the Qing Empire, the Afghan country. In diplomatic relations, the country maintains its integrity by using the trusteeship method, which has become widespread in the Kazakh Khanate as a guarantee of negotiations.

The ruler's talent and art in politics were clearly manifested in his diplomatic ties with neighboring countries. Therefore, as one of the rulers of the Kazakh Khanate, located in the center of the Eurasian continent, Abilmambet pursued a multi-vector policy in accordance with the strategic situation.

In his civil service as a whole, on the one hand, he maintained traditions, listened to the opinions of his vassals and offered a confession to the limitations of his power, on the other hand, his conservatism guaranteed the stability of the policies he adhered to, the persistence of the decisions he made. The main features and historical merit of Abilmambet's foreign policy is that the Kazakh statehood of the XVIII century, when the threat of being under the pressure of empires or not, makes flexible decisions, acts against foreigners, adheres to a multi-vector policy and contributes to preserving integrity.

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